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INTRODUCTION 
 
On April 6, 2017, the United States launched an attack employing fifty-nine U.S. Navy Tomahawk 
Land Attack Missiles against the Al Shayrat airfield in response to Syria’s use of chemical 
weapons against civilians two days earlier.3  The cruise missile strikes constituted the most robust 
example of military intervention without United Nations Security Council approval on the basis 
of human suffering since the 1999 NATO bombing campaign to end abuse of the Kosovar 
Albanians by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.4  They sparked an impassioned debate regarding 
the legality and legitimacy of the operation under both domestic and international law.5  
                                                 
1 Charles H. Stockton Professor and Chairman, Stockton Center for the Study of International Law, United States 
Naval War College; Professor of International Law, University of Exeter; Francis Lieber Distinguished Scholar, 
Lieber Institute, United States Military Academy at West Point. 
2 Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army Judge Advocate.  Associate Director and Military Professor, Stockton 
Center for the Study of International Law, United States Naval War College.  The views expressed are those of the 
authors in the personal capacity. 
3 Michael R. Gordon, Helene Cooper, and Michael D. Shear, Dozens of U.S. Missiles Hit Air Base in Syria, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 6, 2017). 
4 INDEP. INT'L COMMISSION ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT 94 (2000), 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/6D26FF88119644CFC1256989005CD392-
thekosovoreport.pdf.   
5 See e.g., Marty Lederman, Why the Strikes Against Syria Probably Violate the U.N. Charter and (therefore) the 
U.S. Constitution, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/39674/syrian-strikes-violate-u-n-
charter-constitution/; Marko Milanovic, The Clearly Illegal US Missile Strike in Syria, EJIL: TALK! (Apr. 7, 2017), 
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This article examines the administration’s statements justifying the operation.  Although none of 
them was articulated in the patois of international law, we attempt to categorize and asses the 
explanations from that perspective. Three possible legal bases merit attention: self-defense, 
response to an internationally wrongful act, and humanitarian intervention.  In our view, the U.S. 
actions run afoul of limitations resident in each body of law. 
 
Of particular note is the last, for the operation had the feel of humanitarian intervention. Although 
long the subject of serious scholarship,6 the validity of humanitarian intervention as a basis for the 
lawful use of force on another State’s territory without that State’s consent or the imprimatur of 
the United Nations Security Council remains the subject of significant disagreement.7  The missile 
strikes not only raised the issue anew, but, in our view, were normatively consequential.  They 
amounted to State practice that contributed to the crystallization of a customary law right to 
humanitarian intervention.  Arguably, they also influenced the conditions precedent to the exercise 
of that purported right.  We conclude our assessment by offering a tentative suggestion that the 
international community is likely to consider the nature of suffering, in addition to the quantum 
thereof, as bearing on the right of States to mount future humanitarian operations.   
 
I. UNRAVELING THE U.S. JUSTIFICATIONS  
 
The missile strikes into Syria targeted “aircraft, hardened aircraft shelters, petroleum and logistical 
storage, ammunition supply bunkers, air defense systems, and radars.”8  They followed a chemical 
weapons attack against civilians in Khan Sheikhoun, Syria that the United States concluded had 
been conducted by the Syrian armed forces, employing assets located at the airfield.9  Albeit 
horrific, and involving the use of a weapon that is universally condemned as unlawful per se, 
Syria’s attack left less than one hundred civilians dead.  The situation was not one of widespread 
human distress over an extended period, which usually foreshadows external intervention on 
humanitarian grounds. Nevertheless, the U.S. actions received broad support from the international 
community, while being condemned by only a few States.10  
                                                 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-clearly-illegal-us-missile-strike-in-syria/; Ashley Deeks, How Does the Syrian Situation 
Stack up to the “Factors” that Justified Intervention in Kosovo?, LAWFARE (Apr. 7, 2017, 8:28 AM), 
https://lawfareblog.com/how-does-syria-situation-stack-thefactors-justified-intervention-kosovo.   
6 See e.g., Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of “Humanitarian Intervention,” 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 824 (1999); 
Harold H. Koh, The War Powers and Humanitarian Intervention, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 971 (2016); Bruno Simma, 
NATO, the UN and the Use of Force:  Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 (1999); Christopher Greenwood, 
Humanitarian Intervention:  The Case of Kosovo, 2002 FIN. Y.B. OF INT’L L. 141 (2002); Ryan Goodman, 
Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 107 (2006). Our initial thoughts on the subject 
were set forth in Michael Schmitt and Chris Ford, The Use of Force in Response to Syrian Chemical Attacks: 
Emergence of a New Norm?, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 8, 2017, 12:43 PM) https://www.justsecurity.org/39805/force-
response-syrian-chemical-attacks-emergence-norm/.   
7 This question is not addressed by the Articles of State Responsibility.  See International Law Commission, Draft 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, Report on the Work of 
its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at art. 25, commentary ¶ 21 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. 
COMM. 32, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter Articles on State Responsibility]. 
8 U.S. Dept. Def., Statement from Pentagon Spokesman Capt. Jeff Davis on U.S. Strike in Syria (Apr. 6, 2017). 
9 Id. 
10 Countries expressly supporting the U.S. action include the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Turkey, Israel, 
Saudi Arabia, Australia, Italy, Poland, the U.A.E., Japan, and Canada.  Countries opposing the action include Syria, 
Russia, Iran, and Bolivia. Gregor Aisch, Yonette Joseph and Anjali Singhvi, What Countries Support and Which 
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After the operation, senior U.S. officials offered varying justifications for taking the action.11  We 
have grouped their statements based on possible the underlying legal basis.  This is to an extent an 
artificial construct, for the administration has not publicly offered a definitive explanation of the 
legal grounds for the U.S. use of force.12  Accordingly, the categories are merely a heuristic to 
organize the legal analysis. Indeed, some statements can be classified under more than one 
category.   
 
The first group of statements invoke the notion of “preventative action” to stop the spread of 
chemical weapons.  Notably, the President issued a statement that referenced the need to protect 
the “vital national security interest of the United States to prevent and deter the spread and use of 
deadly chemical weapons.”13  Secretary of State Rex Tillerson echoed the President’s comments, 
defending the strikes as part of an effort to prevent chemical weapons from “falling into the hands” 
of “elements that are plotting to reach our shore,”14 while Secretary of Defence James Mattis spoke 
of a need to “deter future use of chemical weapons.”15  The DoD spokesperson declared that the 
strikes were “intended to deter the regime from using chemical weapons again”16 and White House 
Press Secretary Sean Spicer indicated the operation was intended “to stop the proliferation and the 
deterrence [sic] of chemical weapons.”17  National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster likewise 
emphasized the goal of deterring their later use.18 
 
A second group of statements alluded to Syria’s breach of its international obligations.  The U.S. 
Ambassador to the U.N., Nikki Haley, pointed to Syria’s “violation of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention” and “a violation of the U.N. Security Council resolutions,”19 while Tillerson used 
similar language, indicating that the President “is willing to act when governments and actors 
“cross the line on violating commitments they’ve made.”20  
 
The final group of statements highlighted the humanitarian aspects of the operation. Haley 
                                                 
Oppose the U.S. Missile Strikes in Syria, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2017).  
11 See Kate Brannen, Tracking the White House’s Reasons for Bombing Syria, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 11, 2017, 12:16 
PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/39864/track-white-houses-reasons-striking-syria/.  
12 Charlie Savage, Watchdog Group Sues Trump Administration, Seeking Legal Rationale Behind Syria Strikes, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 8, 2017). Compare with Caroline D. Krass, Memorandum Opinion for the Attorney General:  Authority 
to Use Military Force in Libya (Apr. 1, 2011) 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2011/04/31/authority-military-use-in-libya_0.pdf (providing 
the legal basis for the use of force in Libya).   
13 Donald J. Trump, President (Apr. 6, 2017) reprinted in N.Y. TIMES, Transcript and Video:  Trump Speaks about 
Strikes in Syria (Apr. 6, 2017). 
14 Rex W. Tillerson, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks with National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster, (Apr. 6, 2017), 
https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/04/269543.htm.   
15 James Mattis, U.S. Sec’y of Def., Statement by Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis on the U.S. Military Response to 
the Syrian Government’s Use of Chemical Weapons (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.defense.gov/News/News-
Releases/News-Release-View/Article/1146758/statement-by-secretary-of-defense-jim-mattis-on-the-us-military-
response-to-the/. 
16 Davis Statement, supra note 8. 
17 Erik Wemple, The Daily Spicer:  Press Secretary Discusses Policy Toward “Bissaa al-Ashar”, WASH. POST (Apr. 
10, 2017). 
18 H.R. McMaster, U.S. Nat. Sec. Advisor, Interview, FOX NEWS (Apr. 9, 2017). 
19 Olivia Beavers, Haley:  Attack on Syria “One of the President’s Finest Hours,” THE HILL (Apr. 9, 2017).   
20 Tillerson Remarks, supra note 14. 
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remarked that “I can tell you that [the President’s] focus was on the fact that innocent victims were 
hurt.”21 In initial remarks to reporters, Spicer similarly noted, “there’s a huge humanitarian 
component to this.”22  A few days later, he commented, “when you watch babies and children 
being gassed and suffer under barrel bombs, you are instantaneously moved to action.”23  Deputy 
Assistant to the President Sebastian Gorka argued, “when evil happens and you are able to do 
something about it, you do something about it.”24 Finally, McMaster referenced “mass murder 
attacks against innocent civilians.”25  
 
These statements evidence the underlying impetus for the missile strikes, but they fail to set forth 
the administration’s legal basis with either perspicuity, granularity, or transparency. If a formal 
legal analysis was conducted, as it presumably was, the resulting legal opinion has not been 
officially released. Rather, a document entitled “Basis for Using Force” that reportedly circulated 
within the government became public, but unfortunately, like the aforementioned statements, 
merely presented a series of quasi-legal arguments that shed little light on the matter. 26 
 
Nevertheless, the groups of statements can be thought of as loosely invoking three legal bases for 
the operations.  Those focusing on prevention imply justification based upon the self-defense 
exception to the prohibition on the use of force. Statements referring to violations of international 
law may be viewed from the perspective of the law of State responsibility. Finally, statements 
referencing suffering suggest the humanitarian intervention exception, if any, to the prohibition on 
the use of force. The legal analysis that follows is organized around these three normative strands 
that “preclude the wrongfulness” of a State’s resort to force under international law.27  
 
II. ASSESSING THE U.S. JUSTIFICATIONS  
  
Before assessing the U.S. justifications from a legal point of view, it is useful to dispense with one 
red herring, the jus in bello issue of commencement of an armed conflict under international 
humanitarian law.  Clearly, the United States and Syria are involved in an international armed 
conflict because the former engaged in hostilities against the armed forces of the latter; it will 
continue until there is a prolonged cessation of hostilities.28 This conclusion is in accord with both 
                                                 
21 Angela Dewan, US Envoy Nikki Haley say Syria Regime Change is Inevitable, CNN (Apr. 10, 2017).  
22 Sean Spicer, White House Press Sec’y, Press Gaggle (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2017/04/07/press-gaggle-press-secretary-sean-spicer. 
23 John T. Bennett, After Syria Strike, Trump Administration Talks Tough, ROLL CALL (Apr. 17, 2017). 
24 McMaster Interview, supra note 18.  
25 Id.  
26 Basis for Using Force, available at Marty Lederman, (Apparent) Administration Justifications for Legality of 
Strikes Against Syria, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 8, 2017, 1:54 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/39803/apparent-
administration-justifications-legality-strikes-syria/. New York Times reporter Charlie Savage described the 
document as unsigned talking points. Charlie Savage, Watchdog Group Sues Trump Administration, Seeking Legal 
Rationale Behind Syria Strikes, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2017) [hereinafter Basis for Using Force]. 
27 On the grounds for precluding wrongfulness of a State’s action or omission, Articles on State Responsibility, 
supra note 7, ch. V.  
28 This temporal conclusion precludes what trial chamber in Gotovina referred to as a “revolving door between 
applicability and nonapplicability.”  Prosecutor v. Gotovina and Marc, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Judgment, ¶ 1694 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Apr. 15, 2011).  See also Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection 
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 6, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (“the application of the present 
Convention shall cease on the general close of military operations.”); Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 3 
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the ICRC29 and DoD30 interpretations of when such conflicts are triggered and end. Existence of 
the conflict is of no consequence for the purposes of this article, for conflict classification does not 
bear on the legality of the use of force under the jus ad bellum.  
 
As to the jus ad bellum, a military strike by one State targeting the forces of another is the 
paradigmatic example of a violation of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, which prohibits the “threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”31 This provision reflects customary 
international law and is considered a jus cogens norm.32  There are two U.N. Charter-based 
exceptions to the prohibition: Security Council authorization or mandate under Chapter VII and 
self-defense pursuant to Article 51 (and customary international law).33 Consent is a universally 
accepted extra-charter basis for the use of force on another State’s territory, although it is 
improbable a State would consent to the use of force against its own military.34 Unsettled 
customary law exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force may include forcible 
countermeasures, the plea of necessity, and humanitarian intervention.  
 
With respect to the Syria case, there has been no Security Council authorization or mandate for 
the use of force in response to the chemical weapons attack and Syria self-evidently did not consent 
to the attack on its facilities.35 This leaves self-defense, countermeasures, necessity, and 
humanitarian intervention.  
 
                                                 
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (“the application of the Conventions and of this Protocol shall cease … on the 
general close of military operations, and, in the case of occupied territories, on the termination of the occupation...”). 
29 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) commentaries to the 1949 Geneva Conventions makes 
clear that an international armed conflict exists whenever there are hostilities between States.  This is so irrespective 
of “how long the conflict lasts, or how much slaughter takes places. See, e.g., COMMENTARY TO GENEVA 
CONVENTION I FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN THE ARMED FORCES IN 
THE FIELD 32 (2016). 
30 OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL § 3.4.2 (2016) 
[hereinafter DoD Manual] quoting 7 Department of State, Telegram 348126 to American Embassy at Damascus, 
Dec. 8, 1983, III Cumulative Digest of United States Practice in International Law 1981-1988 3456, 3457 (the 
United States considers an armed conflict to exist in “any situation in which there is hostile action between the 
armed forces of two parties, regardless of the duration, intensity or scope of the fighting.”); Id. § 3.8.1.2 (2016) 
(“Hostilities generally would not be deemed to have ceased without an agreement, unless the conditions clearly 
indicate that they are not be resumed or there has been a lapse of time indicating the improbability of resumption.”).  
31 U.N. Charter art. 2(4). 
32 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nic. v U.S.), 1986 ICJ Rep. 14, ¶¶ 187-191 (27 
June) [hereinafter Nicaragua]. See also International Law Commission, Articles on the Law of Treaties with 
Commentaries, art. 53, commentary ¶ 1 (1966), 1966 II YB INT’L L. COMM. 187. 
33 U.N. Charter arts. 42 and 51, respectively. On the customary law nature of the self-defense exception, see 
Nicaragua, supra note 32, ¶ 176. 
34 Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Study on Targeted 
Killings) Report, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6, ¶ 35 (May 28 2010). On consent as a ground precluding the 
wrongfulness of an act, see Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 7, art. 20. 
35 Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the U.N., Identical letters dated Sept. 17, 2015 from the 
Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and 
the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/719 (Sep. 21, 2015), Permanent Representative of the 
Syrian Arab Republic to the U.N., Identical letters dated Sept. 17, 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the 
Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security 
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/727 (Sep. 22, 2015). 
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A. Preventive Action: Self-Defense 
 
Recall that the President, Secretary of Defense, White House Press Secretary, and National 
Security Advisor raised the issues of deterrence to prevent the future use of chemical weapons by 
Syria (and presumably other States) and counter-proliferation. These statements accordingly 
suggest a self-defense justification for the missile strikes, albeit one expressed in the vernacular of 
prevention, rather than as a response to an ongoing or imminent attack.  
 
The modern law of self-defense finds its origins in Daniel Webster’s correspondence in the 
Caroline case, in which he opined that there must be a “necessity of self-defence, instant, 
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation” before resorting to 
force, and that said use must not be “unreasonable or excessive.”36 This construction has since 
been interpreted as articulating the customary law requirements for self-defense, which today exist 
alongside with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.37 Article 51 provides that States have an “inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs.”38  The International Court 
of Justice has confirmed that self-defense must be necessary and proportionate.39  
 
Self-defense may be individual (national) or collective. With respect to the former, for example, 
the United States has asserted a right of individual self-defense against “al-Qaida elements in Syria 
known as the Khorasan Group to address terrorist threats that they pose to the United States and 
our partners and allies.”40  Individual self-defense is not a viable basis for the use of force in the 
instant case since Syria’s chemical weapons attack was not directed at the United States. As to the 
latter, collective defense may only be conducted at the request and on behalf of another State that 
is facing an armed attack.41 The U.S. operations against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, for example, are 
being taken in the collective defense of Iraq.42 Syria, by contrast, used chemical weapons against 
its own citizens, not another State. Since no other State was the subject of an armed attack, there 
was obviously no request in fact or law to the United States for collective defense.  
  
U.S. officials discussing the missile strikes seem, however, to be alluding to a right of 
“preventative” self-defense. There is a longstanding debate over whether States enjoy the right to 
use defensive force before the underlying armed attack is launched.43  The prevailing 
                                                 
36 Letter from Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton (Aug. 6, 1842), 29 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1129, 
1138 (1840–1). 
37 Nicaragua, supra note 32, ¶ 176 (customary international law on self-defense “continues to exist alongside treaty 
law”). 
38 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
39 Nicaragua, supra note 32, ¶ 94; Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 43 (Nov. 6). 
40 Permanent Rep. of the United States of America to the U.N., Letter dated Sept. 23, 2014 from the Permanent Rep. 
of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2014/695 
(Sept. 23, 2014). 
41 Nicaragua, supra note 32, ¶ 199. 
42 Permanent Rep. of the United States of America to the U.N., Letter dated Sept. 23, 2014 from the Permanent Rep. 
of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2014/695 
(Sept. 23, 2014). 
43 Terry D. Gill, The Temporal Dimension of Self-Defense:  Anticipation, Pre-emption, Prevention and Immediacy, 
in, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICTS:  EXPLORING THE FAULTLINES 113 (Michael N. Schmitt and Jelena 
Pejic eds., 2007). 
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understanding is that they may act to preempt an “imminent” attack.44  Such an action has 
traditionally been branded “anticipatory self-defense” in international law. 
 
To the extent there exists a right to anticipatory self-defense, there are limits.45 In our view, 
international law requires that the State that will supposedly launch the armed attack have the 
capability and intent to conduct an armed attack.  It also limits the taking of defensive action to 
the last window of opportunity available to effectively defend oneself.46  In this case, there is no 
evidence to suggest that Syria intended to launch chemical weapons, or any other weapons for that 
matter, against either its neighbors or the United States (including U.S. forces in the region) in the 
future.  In the absence of a reasonable conclusion that Syria harbors such an intent, the purported 
defensive action is purely preventive in nature.47  Such operations are unlawful. International law 
only countenances the use of force, even defensive force, as an option of last resort in the face of 
an attack that is almost surely going to manifest.  Deterrence and counter-proliferation are not 
grounds for employing force against another State. 
 
There is accordingly no basis for relying on the law of self-defense to justify the U.S. missile 
strikes. This is so with respect to both individual and collective defense, and includes actions that 
might be characterized as anticipatory. 
 
B. Breach of International Law Obligations: State Responsibility 
 
The second group of statements indicate the U.S. missile strikes were in part a response to Syria’s 
failure to abide by its international legal obligations regarding chemical weapons. This raises the 
issues of internationally wrongful acts and the appropriate responses thereto under the law of State 
responsibility. In particular, it must be determined whether Syria’s use of chemical weapons 
violated any obligation it owed the United States or another State and, if so, whether forceful 
countermeasures or the use of force based on the plea of necessity were permissible.  
 
1. Countermeasures 
 
The use of chemical weapons is irrefutably banned.  Such use is prohibited in the first instance by 
the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol48 and the Chemical Weapons Convention.49 Syria is Party to both 
                                                 
44 See e.g., DoD Manual, supra note 30, ¶ 1.11.5.1 (“Under customary international law, States had, and continue to 
have, the right to take measures in response to imminent attacks.”); Lord Peter Henry Goldsmith, Attorney General, 
United Kingdom, Oral Answers to Questions, Apr. 21, 2004, HANSARD 660 HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES §§ 370-
71 (“it has been the consistent position of successive United Kingdom Governments over many years that the right 
of self-defence under international law includes the right to use force where an armed attack is imminent.”). 
45 See e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE 233 (5th ed. 2011); Daniel Bethlehem, 
Principles Relevant to the Scope of a State’s Right of Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by 
Nonstate Actors, 2 AM. J. OF INT’L. L. 106 (2012). 
46 Michael N. Schmitt, Pre-Emptive Strategies in International Law, 24 MICH. J. OF INT’L L. 513, 546 (2003). 
47 Oil Platforms, supra note 39, ¶ 64.  See also Chatham House, Principles of International Law on the Use of Force 
in Self-Defence 5 (Oct. 2005), https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/108106. But cf William H. 
Taft IV, Self-Defense and the Oil Platforms Decision, 29 YALE J. INT’L. L. 295, 302 (2004). 
48 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological 
Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65, reprinted in 14 ILM 49 (1975). 
49 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and 
on their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45. 
8 
 
instruments, as is the United States. This being so, Syria’s use of them was an “internationally 
wrongful act,” for it breached a legal obligation owed the other Parties to the treaties.50 Since they 
do not address the use of force or other remedial measures designed to enforce their provisions, 
any responses by States Parties to a breach is left to the realm of the law of State responsibility.  
 
The prohibition on the use of chemical weapons is also universally accepted as customary 
international law.51 This raises the issue of to whom the obligation to refrain from their use is 
owed. In Barcelona Traction, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) confirmed the existence of 
obligations erga omnes, which are obligations owed to the entire international community.52 The 
International Law Commission’s non-binding but authoritative Articles on State Responsibility 
endorse the concept of obligations erga omnes,53 according to which “every State, by virtue of its 
membership in the international community, has a legal interest in the protection of certain basic 
rights and the fulfillment of certain essential obligations.”54   
 
It must consequently be determined whether the use of chemical weapons violates an obligation 
erga omnes. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has characterized 
obligations erga omnes as deriving from the “outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, 
[and] also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person.”55 It is 
reasonable to contend that, given the universally accepted and long-standing ban on the use 
chemical weapons in any circumstance, a duty to refrain from their use against civilians qualifies 
as such an obligation. Assuming, arguendo, that the prohibition on the use of a chemical weapons 
is an obligation erga omnes, Syria has breached a customary international law obligation owed to 
all States. 
 
States to whom a breached treaty or customary law obligation is owed are entitled to various 
remedies under international law.  These include the right to demand cessation, seek assurances 
and guarantees of non-repetition, receive reparations, and take countermeasures.56 In the instant 
case, countermeasures are the most relevant.  Countermeasures are acts (which include both 
actions and omissions) that would otherwise be unlawful but for the fact that they are taken to 
“ensure the cessation of the wrongful act and reparation for its consequences.”57  There are two 
obstacles to styling the U.S. missile strikes as a countermeasure. 
 
First, it is uncertain whether countermeasures may include actions at the use of force level.  The 
Articles on State Responsibility take the position that they are limited to non-forcible actions.58  A 
                                                 
50 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 7, arts. 1-2. 
51 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW STUDY r. 74 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck 
eds., 2005); DoD Manual, supra note 30, § 6.8.2.  See also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 
17, 1998, art. 8(2)(b)(xviii), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (confirming that the use of chemical weapons is also a war crime in 
customary international law). 
52 Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited (Second Phase) (Spain v. Belg.), 
judgment, ¶ 33, 1970 ICJ 3 (5 Feb.). 
53 Articles of State Responsibility, supra note 7, arts. 33, 42(b). 
54 Id., art. 1, commentary ¶ 4. 
55 Barcelona Traction, supra note 52, ¶ 34. 
56 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 7, arts. 22, 29-31.   
57 Id., General Commentary, ¶ 6. 
58 Id., art. 50(1)(a). See also Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Pursuant to Article 287, and in Accordance with Annex 
VII, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Guy. V. Surin.), Award, ¶ 466 (Perm. Ct. Arbitration. 2007). 
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contrary position, expressed most lucidly by Judge Simma in his separate opinion in the Oil 
Platforms judgement, is that forcible countermeasures might be appropriate so long as the acts 
comprising them do not rise to the level of an “armed attack” as contemplated in the law of self-
defense.59  The merits of this position need not be addressed, however, as an operation involving 
the use of 59 cruise missiles clearly exceeds the armed attack threshold. Thus, the operation cannot 
be justified as a countermeasure. 
 
Second, under the law of State responsibility, a State is entitled to invoke the responsibility of 
another State, in this case Syria, if the obligation is owed to a group of States of which both are 
members. All States may do so in the case of obligations erga omnes.60  Yet, the chemical weapons 
were used solely against Syrian civilians. No other State suffered harm because of the Syrian 
violation of the treaties and the possible obligation erga omnes prohibiting the use of chemical 
weapons. It is unclear in international law whether States in these circumstances are entitled to 
take countermeasures, even if the missile strikes qualified had otherwise qualified as such.61 They 
may arguably only demand cessation, assurances, and guarantees.62 
 
Note that in addition to treaty and customary law, Syria is also in breach of Security Council 
Resolution 2118, adopted after Syria’s first use of chemical weapons on August 21, 2013.63 That 
resolution endorsed the Framework for the Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons adopted by 
the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.64 Yet, neither Resolution 2118 nor the 
Framework envision the use of force by individual States in response to a Syrian breach. Since the 
Security Council has not authorized or mandated such action, violation of the resolution provides 
no basis for the U.S. missile strikes.  On the contrary, on February 28, 2017, Russia and China 
vetoed Security Council Draft Resolution 172, which would have authorized a resort to force in 
response to the use of chemical weapons.65 This was the seventh and sixth veto respectively for 
Russia and China on matters related to Syria.66 
 
2. Plea of Necessity 
 
A second ground for taking measures that would otherwise be unlawful is the plea of necessity.  
There have been suggestions that perhaps the plea may provide a ground for the preclusion of the 
wrongfulness of the U.S. use of force under the law of State responsibility.67 We disagree. 
 
The plea allows States to respond to situations that present a “grave and imminent” danger to a 
their “essential interests” by means of an otherwise internationally wrongful act(s) if doing so is 
                                                 
59 Oil Platforms, supra note 39, at ¶¶ 13-16 (Separate Opinion of Judge Simma)  
60 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 7, art. 48(1)(b). 
61 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS, r. 24., commentary ¶ 5 
(Michael N. Schmitt ed. 2017) [hereinafter Tallinn Manual]. 
62 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note __, at art. 48(2)(a). 
63 S.C. Res. 2118 (Sept. 27, 2013). 
64 Id., citing G.A. Res. A/68/398-S/2013/565 (Sept. 24, 2013).  
65 U.N. Doc. S/2017/172 (Feb. 28, 2017). 
66 U.N. Doc. S/2016/1026 (Dec. 5, 2016); U.N. Doc. S/2016/846 (Oct. 8, 2016); U.N. Doc. S/2014/348 (May 22, 
2014); U.N. Doc. S/2012/538 (Jul. 19, 2012); U.N. Doc. S/2012/77 (Feb. 4, 2012); U.N. Doc. S/2011/612 (Oct. 4, 
2011).  
67 Koh, supra note 6, at 1010-1012. 
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the sole means of safeguarding those interests.68 Recently, an international group of experts 
considered whether the interests of the international community as a whole, which might manifest 
in the event of the use of chemical weapons, qualify as an essential interest for the purposes of the 
plea. Most of them agreed, rightly in our view, that only the interests of States that are facing the 
danger so qualify.69  By this interpretation, States other than Syria cannot resort to the plea to 
justify forceful action designed to end the use of chemical weapons on Syrian soil. Moreover, even 
these experts were divided as to whether forceful responses based on the plea are lawful in the first 
place.70 
 
It may be concluded, then, that although the Syrian chemical attacks were, as certain administration 
officials correctly noted, violations of international law, that fact did not alone justify the use of 
force against Syria.   
 
C. Human Suffering: Humanitarian Intervention 
 
The third cohort of administration statements invoked humanitarian considerations, albeit without 
citing humanitarian intervention as an explicit legal basis for the missile strikes. Nevertheless, 
humanitarian intervention is the only possible legal basis for using force to terminate humanitarian 
excesses without the authorization or mandate of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the 
U.N. Charter. As noted, the existence of such a right is an unsettled matter among States and 
international law scholars.   
 
Conceptually, humanitarian intervention can be traced to the Just War tradition.  Grotius argued 
that nations that “provoke their people to despair and resistance by unheard of cruelties” forfeit 
“the rights of independent sovereigns, and can no longer claim the privilege of the law of 
nations.”71 By the nineteenth century, the doctrine enjoyed widespread, but not universal, 
support.72 For instance, examples of force being used, ostensibly on humanitarian grounds, include 
Great Britain, France, and Russia in Greece (1827); France in Syria (1860); Austria, Great Britain, 
France, Prussia and Russia in the Mount Lebanon Civil War (1860); Russia in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Bulgaria (1877); the United States in Cuba (1898); and Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia in 
Macedonia (1903, 1912).73  
 
Some commentators question the humanitarian basis of those interventions. For example, in 1963 
Ian Brownlie suggested that “state practice justifies the conclusion that no genuine case of 
humanitarian intervention has occurred, with the possible exception of Syria in 1860 and 1861.”74 
                                                 
68 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 7, art. 25.  
69 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 61, r. 26, commentary ¶ 3. 
70 Id., r. 26, commentary ¶ 18. 
71 GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI, Book II, ch. XXV, 8. See also EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, vol. 2, ch. IV, 
¶¶ 55-56. 
72 IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 338 (1963). But cf HENRY G. HODGES, 
THE DOCTRINE OF INTERVENTION 87 (1915) (“[a]s regards an intervention taken in the cause of humanity there 
seems to be a divergence of opinion among the most prominent writers…”)(italics in original). 
73 J.L. Holzgrefe, The Humanitarian Intervention Debate in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:  ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND 
POLITICAL DILEMMAS 45 (J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, eds. 2003).   
74 Brownlie, supra note 72, at 340. 
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Indeed, by the twentieth century, most support for the premise that States may take military action 
in other States on humanitarian grounds had trailed off.75 
 
Despite codification of key jus ad bellum principles in the U.N. Charter, the matter has not been 
settled. There is a general sense that a customary international law norm allowing humanitarian 
intervention in limited circumstances might be slowly emerging76 and several prominent 
commentators have endorsed the concept.77 Yet, crystallization of a customary law ground 
precluding the wrongfulness of an action (here the use of force) requires rather conclusive State 
practice and opinio juris.78  
 
State expressions of support for the right of humanitarian intervention are sparse. The most 
significant and explicit expression of such opinio juris is that cited above, the UK Prime Minister’s 
Office’s policy paper issued following the use of chemical weapons in Eastern Damascus on 
August 21, 2013.79 The paper unequivocally asserts the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention 
“in order to alleviate the scale of the overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe in Syria by deterring 
and disrupting the further use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime.”80 Furthermore, in 
January 2014, the Minister of State, Sir Hugh Robertson, affirmed the United Kingdom’s 
acceptance of humanitarian intervention as a basis for the use of force. 81 Although the United 
Kingdom did not reference humanitarian intervention in its November 2014 notice to the Security 
                                                 
75 A notable exception in this regard were the views of renowned international law scholar Sir Hersch Lauterpacht. 
Id. at 341, citing Hersch Lauterpacht, AN INTERNATIONAL BILL OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN 46 (1945). 
76Antonio Cassese, Ex Iniuria Ius Oritur:  Are We Moving Towards International Legitimation of Forcible 
Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community? 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 791 (1999); Adam Roberts, NATO’s 
Humanitarian War over Kosovo, 41 SURVIVAL 102, 120 (Aug. 1999) (NATO operations in Kosovo may be a 
“halting step in a developing but still contested practice of using force in defence of international norms.”); Ruth 
Wedgwood, Editorial Comments:  NATO’s Kosovo Intervention:  NATO’s Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 828, 834 (Oct. 1999) (“At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that the Kosovo intervention may 
represent a sea change in the responsibility of multilateral organizations to attempt to thwart ethnic slaughter…”). 
77 Daniel Bethlehem, Stepping Back a Moment—The Legal Basis in Favour of a Principle of Humanitarian 
Intervention, EJIL:  TALK! (Sept. 12, 2013); Koh, supra note 6; Christopher Greenwood, Memorandum Submitted by 
Christopher Greenwood to the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs (May 11, 2000), 
https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/ cmfaff/28/0020802.htm; Thomas M. 
Franck, Humanitarian and Other Interventions, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 321, 326-27 (2005) (Referencing 
humanitarian intervention, Franck writes, “[t]o use a simile coined by Simon Chesterman, the problem is to 
distinguish between the rare instances in which vigilante justice is the last hope of the victim in distress from those 
in which every gunslinger seeks to be empowered by a sheriff's badge.  The answer must be found in devising a 
process for separating the sheep of socially-justified non-compliance from the goats of self-interested law-
breaking.”). 
78 North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3 ¶¶ 70-74 (Feb. 20). 
See also HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, I INTERNATIONAL LAW:  COLLECTED PAPERS 61 (1970) (“International law custom 
signifies constant and uniform practice followed by States as a matter of obligation.”).   
79 U.K. Prime Minister’s Office, Chemical Weapon Use by Syrian Regime: UK Government Legal Position, GOV.UK 
(Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-
government-legal-position/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-government-legal-position-html-version 
[hereinafter P.M. Office Statement]. 
80 Id.  
81 Letter from the Rt. Hon. Hugh Robertson MP, U.K. Minister of State, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, to the 
Rt. Hon. Sir Richard Ottaway MP, U.K. House of Commons (Jan. 14, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/01/Letter-from-UK-Foreign-Commonwealth-Office-to-the-House-of-Commons-Foreign-
Affairs-Committee-on-Humanitarian-Intervention-and-the-Responsibility-to-Protect.pdf. [hereinafter Robertson 
Letter]. 
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Council with respect the UK’s use of force in Syria,82 the Attorney General later confirmed the 
UK’s support of a right to intervene on humanitarian grounds in a January 2017 speech at the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies.83 
 
The United Kingdom’s position regarding Syria is in keeping with statements made following the 
1999 NATO operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  In debate at the Security Council, 
it noted that the military action regarding Kosovo “is legal.  It is justified as an exceptional measure 
to prevent an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe.”84  In the same proceedings, the Dutch 
ambassador remarked “we cannot sit back and simply let the humanitarian catastrophe occur. In 
such a situation, we will act on the legal basis we have available.”85 Belgium subsequently argued 
before the International Court of Justice that the NATO action was “an armed humanitarian 
intervention, compatible with Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter, which covers only intervention 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of a State.”86 
 
The U.N. Security Council has sometimes approved humanitarian interventions after their launch.  
Such approval would logically be inconsistent with the unlawfulness of the operations ab initio. 
For example, in August 1990, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
intervened militarily in Liberia in the face of a humanitarian crisis.87 According to the ECOWAS 
committee charged with addressing the conflict, “there is a government in Liberia which cannot 
govern and contending factions which are holding the entire population as hostage, depriving them 
of food, health facilities and other basic necessities of life.”88 Although the President of Liberia, 
Samuel Doe, had requested ECOWAS intervention,89 at the time he was “trapped within the 
executive mansion” and exercised no control over the country; thus, he was arguably no longer 
functioning as the leader of the Liberian government.90  In any event, EOCWAS’ actions, which 
were not authorized by the U.N. Security Council, did not conform to Doe’s request.91  The 
President of the Security Council nevertheless issued a statement in January 1991 commending 
                                                 
82 Permanent Rep. of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the U.N., Identical letters dated 
Nov. 25, 2014 from the Permanent Rep. of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United 
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2014/851 (Nov. 
26, 2014) (the UK noted that it was “taking measures in support of the collective self-defence of Iraq”).  See also 
Prime Minister David Cameron, Statement to Parliament about Iraq: Coalition Against ISIL (Sept. 26, 2014), 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm140926/debtext/140926-
0001.htm#1409266000252. 
83 Jeremy Wright, Attorney General, Attorney General’s Speech at International Institute for Strategic Studies:  The 
Modern Law of Self-Defence (Jan. 11, 2017), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/01/United-Kingdom-Attorney-General-Speech-modern-law-of-self-defense-IISS.pdf.   
84 Statement of Sir Jeremy Greenstock, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations, 
U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3988th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3988. 
85 Statement of Peter van Walsum U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3988th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3988. 
86 Oral Pleadings of Belgium, Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Belg.), 1999 I.C.J. Pleadings 12 (May 10, 1999, 
3:00 p.m. hearing). 
87 Comfort Ero, ECOWAS and the Subregional Peacekeeping in Liberia, J. OF HUMAN. ASSISTANCE (Sept. 25, 1995) 
available at https://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/66 [hereinafter Ero]. 
88 ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, Banjul, Republic of Gambia, Final Communiqué of the First Session, 
7 August 1990, Document 54, quoted in Comfort Ero, supra note 87. 
89 Ero, supra note 87. 
90 Id. 
91 THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE:  STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS 156 
(2002). 
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“the efforts made by the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government to promote peace and 
normalcy in Liberia.”92  
 
Similarly, the sectarian and tribal conflict that was precipitated by the ouster of Somalia’s 
President, Siad Barre, in 1991 led to a humanitarian catastrophe. 93  Humanitarian assistance 
missions were launched into the country, including Operation Provide Relief in August of the 
following yea,  Provide Relief was supported by elements of the U.S. Army 5th Special Forces 
Group.94  Despite some U.N. coordination with the Somali Charge D’Affaires, Somalia did not 
consent to the U.S. and international actions.95 Additionally, the Security Council expressly 
authorized the use of force under Chapter VII only in December.96 Yet, several Security Council 
resolutions passed after Operation Provide Relief commended States for providing humanitarian 
assistance.97  
 
In 1997, ECOWAS intervened militarily in Sierra Leone by overthrowing a rebel junta and 
restoring the democratically elected government. ECOWAS’ actions plainly went beyond any 
authority granted by then-existing Security Council resolutions.98  Still, a subsequent Security 
Council Resolution expressed “strong support for the efforts of the ECOWAS Committee to 
resolve the crisis in Sierra Leone…”99 
 
More recently, France’s 2013 use of force in Mali exemplifies post hoc Security Council 
endorsement. The French Foreign Minister asserted that the use of force came in response “to a 
formal request by the Malian President and is being conducted in accordance with the UN Charter, 
in compliance with U.N. Security Council Resolutions 2056, 2071 and 2085.”100 The claim of 
consent merits examination.  At the time of the operation, there was a “de facto partition of Mali 
between the Islamists in the north and the Malian government in the south.”101 The interim 
President of the south provided the consent.102  As with President’s Doe’s request for ECOWAS 
intervention in Liberia, it is not altogether clear that he exercised the “effective control” of the 
State that was necessary under international law to have had the authority to consent to France’s 
use of force.103  And with respect to the cited resolutions, none included an authorization for the 
use of force.104   
                                                 
92 Note by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/22133 (Jan. 22, 1991). 
93 U.S. Dept. Def., THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN SOMALIA 1992-1994 (CMH Pub 70-81-1), 6 (1994). 
94 Id. at 8.  
95 Somalia, UNOSOM I Background Report, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/ 
unosom1backgr2.html (“Somalia remained without a central government with which to negotiate… Several of the 
Somali de facto authorities refused to agree to the deployment of United Nations troops to secure delivery of aid in 
areas of greatest need.”). 
96 S.C. Res. 794 (Dec. 3, 1992). 
97 Id.; S.C. Res. 746 (Mar. 17, 1992); S.C. Res. 767 (July 24, 1992); S.C. Res. 775 (Aug. 28, 1992). 
98 CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 227 (2000). 
99 S.C. Res. 1132 (Oct. 8, 1997). 
100 M. Laurent Fabius, French Foreign Minister, Press Conference (Jan. 14, 2013), 
http://reliefweb.int/report/mali/press-conference-given-m-laurent-fabius-minister-foreign-affairs-january-14-2013.   
101 Michael Shurkin, France’s War in Mali, RAND Corporation Report 7 (2014). 
102 Edward Cody, France’s Hollande Sends Troops to Mali, WASH. POST (Jan. 11, 2013). 
103 A government represents the State as long as it is in “effective control of that state.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 203 (AM. LAW INSTIT.1987). 
104 S.C. Res. 2056 (Jul. 5, 2012); S.C. Res. 2071 (Oct. 12, 2012); S.C. Res. 2085 (Dec. 20, 2012). 
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Despite the questionable nature of the purported consent and the lack of Security Council 
authorization, numerous countries, including Belgium, Denmark, Germany, United Kingdom, and 
United States, provided logistical support to the operation.105 For its part, the Security Council 
“[w]elcom[ed] the swift action by the French forces, at the request of the transitional authorities 
of Mali, to stop the offensive of terrorist, extremist and armed groups towards the south of 
Mali.” 106   
 
Before launching the missile strikes against Syria, the United States had participated in only a few 
humanitarian interventions, the most notable being Operation Provide Comfort in Iraq, which 
began in 1991, and NATO’s 1999 bombing campaign in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The 
former was a response to Iraq’s brutal suppression of the Kurds in northern Turkey after they 
revolted against Saddam Hussein’s regime following the first Gulf War. Thousands fled into the 
mountains of northern Iraq and southeastern Turkey to escape the slaughter.107 In response, 
military personnel deployed from Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom to ensure their 
security and encourage them to descend from the mountains where the oncoming winter conditions 
would imperil them.108 The coalition coordinated with Iraqi military personnel regarding their 
activities on Iraqi territory, but did not operate with Iraq’s consent.109 On the contrary, the Iraqi 
representative negotiating with U.S. military commanders “protested the entry of collation forces 
into Iraq.”110 Subsequently, Iraqi forces were forced to leave a security zone adjacent to the 
Turkish border, and a no-fly zone was established in northern Iraq above the 36th parallel to provide 
continuing protection. In 1992, the United States established a similar no-fly zone in southern Iraq 
to protect the so-called marsh Arabs.111 
 
Initial statements from President Bush suggested the operation was a humanitarian action taken 
under Security Council Resolution 688.112 The plain language of the resolution, however, provided 
no authority for the use of force in northern Iraq. Rather, it merely “demand[ed]” that Iraq end its 
repression and “insist[ed] that Iraq allow immediate access by the international humanitarian 
organizations to all those in need of assistance.” 113 
 
                                                 
105 M. Laurent Fabius, French Foreign Minister, Press Conference (Jan. 14, 2013), 
http://reliefweb.int/report/mali/press-conference-given-m-laurent-fabius-minister-foreign-affairs-january-14-2013.   
106 S.C. Res. 2100 (Apr. 25, 2013). 
107 See generally GORDON W. RUDD, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:  ASSISTING THE IRAQI KURDS IN OPERATION 
PROVIDE COMFORT, 1991 (2004).  
108 Id. at 226. 
109 At the meeting between the senior U.S. military commander and the Iraqi emissary, the U.S. general “explained 
the coalition’s objective of creating a security zone for the Kurds and then issued a vigorous demarche stressing that 
coalition forces would cross the Iraqi border and enter Zakho the next day… At the same time, the State Department 
had sent another message to Iraqi diplomats, explaining the demarche and warning them not to interfere.” Id. at 114 
110 Id. at 115. 
111 Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, Briefing (Sept. 30, 2002), 
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0209/30/se.05.html.   
112 George Bush, President, Remarks on Assistance for Iraqi Refugees and a News Conference, Apr. 16, 1991, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19479.  (This action was “made necessary by the terrible human tragedy 
unfolding in and around Iraq” and is “[c]onsistent with United Nations Security Council Resolution 688…”).  
113 S.C. Res. 688 (Apr. 5, 1991). 
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On March 24, 1999, NATO launched Operation Allied Force to prevent the ethnic cleansing of 
the minority Albanian population in the province of Kosovo by the predominately Serbian forces 
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).114  From March 24 to June 9, NATO flew over 
38,000 sorties, roughly a third of which were attack missions.115 Although the threat of a Russian 
veto precluded Security Council action, NATO’s Secretary General stated, “[w]e must stop the 
violence and bring an end to the humanitarian catastrophe now taking place in Kosovo. We have 
a moral duty to do so.”116 At the time, NATO consisted of nineteen member States. Since NATO 
operates by consensus, the operation had to be approved by all 19 NATO nations.117   
 
The day before the air campaign was launched, President Clinton characterized the situation as a 
“genocide in the heart of Europe,”118 and, recalling the lessons of Bosnia, noted “if you don’t stand 
up to brutality and the killing of innocent people, you invite the people who do it to do more of it. 
We learned that firmness can save lives and stop armies.”119 The United Kingdom was more 
explicit, urging that “force can be justified on the grounds of overwhelming humanitarian necessity 
without a UNSCR.”120 
 
Both the Iraq and Kosovo cases involved extended military operations conducted by multiple 
countries, most of which are generally viewed as committed to the international rule of law. 
Although there was neither consent nor Security Council approval in the two cases, participating 
States employed force based on dire humanitarian need. Unless one concludes that the States 
involved willingly violated international law, they are strong indications that a customary norm 
permitting intervention has been in the process of surfacing. Indeed, a recent statement from the 
United Kingdom Minister of State notes that the United Kingdom has invoked the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention on three occasions: protecting the Kurds in northern Iraq, no fly zones 
in north and south of Iraq, and the use of force in Kosovo.121   
 
Finally, when substantial humanitarian crises occur, States are often subjected to criticism for 
failure to intervene. The most glaring failure in this regard is the Rwandan genocide of 1994.  Over 
the course of a mere 100 days, approximately 800,000 Rwandans were butchered.122 The failure 
of the international community to intervene was widely condemned, including in a harsh internal 
UN review.123 Further, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
                                                 
114 See generally Operation Allied Force:  Lessons for Future Coalition Operations, RAND Corporation Report 
(2001), http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB72/index1.html   
115 Air Force Historical Support Division, 1999-Operation Allied Force (Aug. 23, 2012), 
http://www.afhistory.af.mil/FAQs/Fact-Sheets/Article/458957/operation-allied-force/.   
116 Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General, Press Statement (Mar. 24, 1999), http://nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-
041e.htm.  
117 NATO, NATO HANDBOOK 15 (2006). 
118 William J. Clinton, President, Remarks at the Legislative Convention of the American Federation of State, 
County and Municipal Employees (Mar. 23, 1999), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57294. 
119 Id. 
120 UK FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, FRY/KOSOVO: THE WAY AHEAD; UK VIEW ON THE LEGAL BASE FOR 
USE OF FORCE (1998), quoted in Adam Roberts, NATO’s ‘Humanitarian War’ over Kosovo, 41 SURVIVAL 102, 106 
(1999). 
121 Robertson Letter, supra note 81. 
122 Rwandan Genocide:  100 Days of Slaughter, BBC NEWS (Apr. 7, 2014). 
123 Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, 
U.N. Doc. S/199/1257 (Dec. 15, 1999). 
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crafted its Responsibility to Protect concept as a means to avoid “more Rwandas.”124 Similarly, 
commentators and civil society organizations widely criticized the slow and inadequate  response 
to the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, Sudan, that began in 2003.125 
 
Considering, inter alia, the evidence set forth above, it is becoming increasingly difficult to deny 
that, if it has not already crystallized as some suggest, a right of humanitarian intervention is 
emerging. States clearly find it legitimate to intervene in cases of severe humanitarian crisis, even 
if a corresponding legal right does not definitively exist. Repeated actions based on legitimacy are 
fertile ground for the growth of new customary norms. The fact that the U.S. missile strikes were 
justified based on the humanitarian imperative of deterring repeated use of a horrendous weapon 
provides support in the form of State practice for the crystallization of a right of humanitarian 
intervention.  
 
Much of the apprehension about the emergence of humanitarian intervention as a basis for the use 
of force concerns potential abuse by States.126  To address that risk, commentators endorsing 
humanitarian intervention have proffered preconditions that should be met before force is used to 
stop humanitarian suffering in other countries.127  However, the best indicators of the conditions 
under which humanitarian interventions are likely to be judged lawful are the legal justifications 
put forth by States that engage in them and general expressions opinio juris.  
 
In this regard, the United Kingdom has articulated a test of cumulative factors that must be met 
before a humanitarian intervention is lawful.  By that test, such operations may only be mounted 
when action is blocked in the Security Council, 
 
(i) there is convincing evidence, generally accepted by the international 
community as a whole, of extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale, 
requiring immediate and urgent relief; 
 
(ii) it [is] objectively clear that there is no practicable alternative to the use 
of force if lives are to be saved; and 
 
(iii) the proposed use of force [is] necessary and proportionate to the aim of 
relief of humanitarian need and must be strictly limited in time and scope to 
this aim (i.e. the minimum necessary to achieve that end and for no other 
purpose).128 
 
In contrast, the United States has not acknowledged humanitarian intervention as a ground for the 
use of force. Still, policy statements made in the aftermath of Iraq, Kosovo, and Syria suggest the 
                                                 
124 Int’l Comm’n on Intervention & State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, at VIII (Dec. 2001). 
125 See e.g., Michael Clough, Darfur:  Whose Responsibility to Protect?, Human Rights Watch (n.d.), 
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k5/darfur/darfur.pdf. 
126 Ryan Goodman, Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 107 (2006). 
127 See generally, Ashley Deeks, Commentary:  Multi-Part Tests in the Jus ad Bellum, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 1035 
(2016) (discussing multi-part tests from Harold Koh, the United Kingdom, the Independent International 
Commission on Kosovo, the Danish Institute of International Affairs, and the International Commission on 
International Affairs, citations omitted).  
128 P.M. Office Statement, supra note 79; Robertson Letter, supra note 81.  
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U.S. approach to undertaking humanitarian military action is generally consistent with the UK 
position.  It is also remarkably unchanged over nearly two decades.   
 
Consider the 1991 incursion into northern Iraq.  While the stated U.S. justification was 
enforcement of UN Security Council Resolution 688, in various statements President Bush 
justified the operation on the basis that it was (1) a short-term measure designed to address 
humanitarian concerns;129 (2) in response to a significant humanitarian crisis;130 (3) which had to 
potential to destabilize the region;131 (4) and was taken with broad coalition support.132 Similarly, 
following the 1999 intervention in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Michael Matheson, the 
Acting Legal Advisor for the Department of State, noted that there was a pressing “danger of 
humanitarian disaster” and pointed to the “inability of Security Council to make a clear decision 
adequate to deal with that disaster.” 133 He also highlighted the potential for regional 
destabilization, the significant multilateral support, and Yugoslavia’s violation of “obligations 
under international humanitarian agreements.”134 According to Matheson, the use of force by 
NATO forces was proportionate and limited in duration.135  In the Syria case, the “Basis for Using 
of Force” document cited earlier mentions the existence of “severe humanitarian distress,” 
“widespread violations” of international legal obligations, and potential for regional 
destabilization, and argues that the use of force was necessary and proportionate to the aim of 
preventing further Syrian use of chemical weapons.    
  
To summarize, the United Kingdom and United States appear to accept the following criteria for 
intervention.  First, a certain quantum of harm must manifest.  The United Kingdom uses the term 
“extreme humanitarian distress,”136 while the United States variously refers to “humanitarian 
disaster,”137 “terrible human tragedy,”138 and “severe humanitarian distress.”139  Second, the 
situation must be one with regard to which the Security Council cannot or will not act.  Third, the 
use of force has to be necessary, proportionate, and limited to alleviating human suffering.  Finally, 
there appears to be a clear preference for some degree of international consensus on the need for 
action, and, at least by the U.S. view, a preference for multilateral action.   
                                                 
129 Bush, Remarks on Assistance for Iraqi Refugees, supra note 112 (“And I want to stress that this new effort, 
despite its scale and scope, is not intended as a permanent solution to the plight of the Iraqi Kurds. To the contrary, it 
is an interim measure designed to meet an immediate, penetrating humanitarian need.”) 
130 Id. (U.S. intervention in Iraq was “made necessary by the terrible human tragedy unfolding in and around Iraq as 
a result of Saddam Hussein's brutal treatment of Iraqi citizens.”) See also George Bush, President, Statement on Aid 
to Iraqi Refugees (Apr. 5, 1991), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19441, (“The human tragedy unfolding 
in and around Iraq demands immediate action on a massive scale.”).  
131 Id. (“At stake are not only the lives of hundreds of thousands of innocent men, women, and children but the peace 
and security of the Gulf.”).   
132 Bush, Remarks on Assistance for Iraqi Refugees, supra note 112 (“It is for this reason that this afternoon, 
following consultations with Prime Minister Major, President Mitterrand, President Ozal of Turkey, Chancellor 
Kohl this morning, U.N. Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar, I'm announcing a greatly expanded and more 
ambitious relief effort.”). 
133 Michael J. Matheson, Justification for the NATO Air Campaign in Kosovo, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 301, 301 
(2000). 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 P.M. Office Statement, supra note 79. 
137 Matheson, supra note 133, at 301. 
138 Bush, President, Remarks on Assistance for Iraqi Refugees, supra note 112. 
139 Basis for Using Force, supra note 26.     
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Assuming for the sake of analysis that a right of humanitarian intervention exists, there would 
seem to be no question that the scale of the human suffering in Syria merits such an operation. The 
conflict has resulted in at least 450,000 dead,140 more than four-and-a-half-million refugees,141 and 
six-and-a-half-million internally displaced Syrians.142 There have been countless war crimes, 
including direct attacks on civilians, multiple uses of chemical weapons, and indiscriminate 
artillery bombardments, as well as the use of weaponry that poses particular risks to the civilian 
population, such as cluster munitions, barrel bombs, and fuel-air bombs.143  The situation is both 
horrific and ongoing, with no end to the suffering in sight. 
 
However, the missile strikes were not a direct response to the overall suffering, but instead only to 
Syria’s use of chemical weapons. The suffering caused by the Syrian chemical weapons attack is 
significantly less than that of any other example cited above.  Additionally, the U.S. missile strikes 
cannot reasonably have been believed to deter any abuses other than the use of the outlawed 
weapons. Thus, even though the strikes might strengthen the general case for humanitarian 
intervention, they do not appear to qualify as lawful humanitarian intervention, for they fail to 
satisfy the quantum of harm criterion.  
 
CONCLUSION: SUBTLE SHIFT IN APPROACH?  
 
It appears certain that many States now view humanitarian intervention as legitimate in extreme 
circumstances, if not also lawful. As noted, the fact that the U.S. missile strikes were justified in 
part based on the humanitarian suffering caused by the Syrian use of chemical weapons reinforces 
the argument for the existence of such a right.  Despite the failure to satisfy the quantum of harm 
criterion, in our view, the episode may signal a subtle shift in State attitudes towards humanitarian 
intervention.   
 
The determinative factor, in this case, was not the scale of the suffering, but rather that the attendant 
suffering resulted from the use of a long-demonized unlawful weapon that has unspeakable human 
effects.  This conclusion suggests that that the nature of harm should be considered as a factor to 
consider vis-a-vis humanitarian intervention in addition to, or perhaps even in lieu of, the quantum 
of harm, at least when there is a risk of recurrence.  It is not without note, in this regard, that a 
number of States have publically expressed support for the missile strike, including the United 
Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, Spain, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Turkey.144  
                                                 
140 Priyanka Boghani, A Staggering New Death Toll for Syria’s War—470,000, FRONTLINE (Feb. 11, 2016), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/a-staggering-new-death-toll-for-syrias-war-470000/. 
141 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Syrian Arab Republic, http://www.unocha.org/syria. 
142 Id. 
143 See generally, U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on 
the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HCR/S-17/2/Add.1 (Nov. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Report 1]; U.N. Human 
Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/19/69 (Feb. 22, 2012) [hereinafter Report 2]; U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent 
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/50 (Aug. 16, 2012) 
[hereinafter Report 3]; U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry 
on the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/59 (Feb. 5, 2013) [hereinafter Report 4]; U.N. Human Rights 
Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/23/58 (Jul. 18, 2013) [hereinafter Report 5]. 
144 See Gregor Aisch, Yonette Joseph and Anjali Singhvi, What Countries Support and Which Oppose the U.S. 
19 
 
Furthermore, France and Germany issued a joint statement implicitly supporting the U.S. action,145 
and senior officials at the EU and NATO have spoken approvingly of the operation.146 It is 
inconceivable that these States and international organizations missed the fact that the chemical 
weapons attack resulted in a quantum of suffering that, had other means been used, would have 
provoked not a whisper of humanitarian intervention.   
 
To the extent a humanitarian intervention norm exists or is in the process of emerging, States are 
plainly according “value” to the nature of the harm they are seeking to mitigate. Indeed, it was the 
first use of chemical weapons, not the fact that the suffering had reached a particular level, that 
inspired the United Kingdom’s willingness to embrace humanitarian intervention in Syria. One 
has to wonder whether a similar reaction would attend situations involving other particularly 
onerous weaponry that has long been outlawed, such as biological, radiological, or poisonous 
weapons. 
 
This possibility of a shift in approach to the purported right of humanitarian intervention is not 
unprecedented. By its nature, customary international law evolves in accordance with the conduct 
of States combined with opinio juris.  This evolutionary dynamic of crystallization is often driven 
by States acting in ways that are not contemplated by existing law and, indeed, sometimes contrary 
to that law.  What we may be witnessing, then, is the slow and somewhat painful birth of a nascent 
right in customary international law allowing States to act forcefully to put an end to the use of 
particularly repugnant weaponry against a civilian population, or perhaps even one countenancing 
forceful State responses to other egregious forms of terrorizing and massacring civilian 
populations in other countries. If, however, this commendable norm of international law is ever to 
fully crystallize, States must have the moral courage to set forth their legal basis for use of force 
in the form of explicit expressions of opinio juris. Their failure to do so, among other things, leaves 
the world less safe. 
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